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COMMENTS

drug legislation is not an "all or nothing" situation. There exist
alternative methods for reducing the social costs besides legalization. Examples of such compromise solutions included in the
UCDSA are conditional discharge provisions, civil court actions
and fines, reduction of possession penalties and emphasis on the
apprehension of traffickers.
Vance R. Andrus and Charles R. Moore

DOUBLE JEOPARDYDEFINING THE SAME OFFENSE
The ancient laws provided that the state could not twice
put a person in jeopardy for the same offense. There was limited
expression of this principle in the Digest of Justinian, and the
proscription was firmly entrenched in English common law by
the seventeenth century.' A prohibition was incorporated into
the fifth amendment of the United States Constitution which
provides in part, "[N]or shall any person be subject for the same
offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb ....12 This
guarantee has recently been applied to state proceedings via the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment in Benton v.
Maryland. The Benton ruling, however, merely affirmed a
maxim already accepted in all state constitutions and statutes."
The purpose of this Comment is to examine the various standards used in determining when a second jeopardy exists and
to evaluate their effectiveness in terms of the principles underlying the double jeopardy clause. Particular attention will be
1. Comment, 75 YALE L.J. 262 n.1 (1965): "Actually the double jeopardy
principle existed in the days of the Greeks and Romans .... Canon law
contained a similar principle. There Is evidence that a plea similar to double

jeopardy may have appeared in English law as early as the fourteenth century, but the earliest conclusive evidence of the principle appears in writings

of Hale (seventeenth century), and Coke (seventeenth century), and later In
Blackstone (eighteenth century)."
2. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
3. 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
4. See, e.g., LA. CONST. art. 1, § 9: "...
nor shall any person be twice put
in jeopardy of life or liberty for the same offense, except on his own application for a new trial, or where there is a mistrial, or a motion in arrest of
judgment is sustained." See also Comment, 21 LA. L. REv. 615 (1961): "The
maxim 'nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy of life or liberty for
the same offense' is incorporated Into Article I, § 9, of the Louisiana Constitution. Although the phraseology may differ, this maxim is accepted in
all federal and state courts."
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devoted to a discussion of the collateral estoppel theory, recently
incorporated into the fifth amendment. 5
Policies Underlying the Double Jeopardy Clause
A judgment of acquittal, whether it results from a jury verdict or from an order by the court, terminates the prosecution,
and the double jeopardy clause bars any further criminal proceedings against the defendant for the same offense.7 However,
acquittal in the criminal action does not bar a civil suit based
on the same facts, since different standards of proof are involved. 8
The idea that the state, with all its resources and power, should
not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual of an alleged offense 9 is based on several policies. First,
reprosecution for the same offense after an acquittal is prohibited because guilt should be established by proving the elements of a crime to the satisfaction of a single jury, not by capitalizing on the increased probability of conviction resulting
from repeated prosecutions before several such panels. 10 Second, reprosecution after a conviction is prohibited to prevent the
prosecutor from searching for an agreeable sentence by bringing
successive prosecutions for the same offense before different
judges." Third, the fifth amendment forbids a second trial,
not merely a second conviction, for the same offense in an effort
to prevent criminal trials from becoming an instrument for
unnecessarily badgering individuals.1 2 Finally, courts are prevented from imposing multiple punishments for a single legislatively defined offense. 13
5. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970).

6. Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141 (1962); United States v.
Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896).
7. United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532 (1947); Gavieres v. United States,
220 U.S. 338 (1911); United States v. Kramer, 289 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1961).
8. United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485,
492-94 (1950); Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 397-98 (1938); Jones v. District of Columbia, 212 F. Supp. 438 (D.C. 1962).

9. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957).
10. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957); United States v. Coke,
404 F.2d 836 (2d Cir. 1968); Murray & Sorenson v. United States, 207 F.2d 119
(1st Cir. 1953); Bryan v. United States, 175 F.2d 223 (5th Cir. 1949), afljd,
338 U.S. 552 (1950).
11. United States v. Coke, 404 F.2d 836 (2d Cir. 1968); United States v.
Sabella, 272 F.2d 206 (2d Cir. 1959); Smith v. United States, 177 F.2d 434 (10th
Cir. 1949).
12. United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896); Rowley v. Welch, 114 F.2d
499 (D.C. 1940); United States v. Perrone, 161 F. Supp. 252 (S.D. N.Y. 1958).
13. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969); United States v. Coke,
404 F.2d 836 (2d Cir. 1968).
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Defining the Same Offense
Although courts and writers unanimously agree that it
would be deplorable to force a defendant to undergo a second
trial for the same offense, a great diversity of opinion exists as
to the meaning of the phrase "same offense" as used in the double
jeopardy clause. Over the years, the majority of state and federal courts have developed three basic approaches in determining when a second trial will constitute double jeopardythe same evidence test, the same transaction test, and 1he collateral estoppel theory. These approaches, however, are not
mutually exclusive, and the same court sometimes uses them
interchangeably, thus, causing more confusion over the term
"same offense."' 14
The Same Evidence Test
Under the same evidence test, a conviction or acquittal upon
one indictment does not bar a subsequent conviction and sentence upon another charge "unless the evidence required to
support the finding of guilt upon one of them would have been
sufficient to warrant the same result upon the other."'15 This
test was first enunciated in 1796 in the English case of Rex v.
Vandercomb & Abbott,' and a majority of American jurisdictions have since adopted it. 1 The rule has not always, however,
been strictly applied and several modifications of the test have
been developed by the courts.
One such modification of the same evidence test was enun8
Under this "backwards test,"'19
ciated in State v. Brownrigg.1
offenses are the same only if the defendant could have been
convicted of the second offense on the evidence offered at the
first trial. This differs from the original rule in that it is based
on the actual evidence presented at the second trial rather than
20
the evidence or facts alleged in the second indictment.
14. See Note, 7 BROOKLYN L. REV. 79, 85 (1937).
15. Morey v. Commonwealth, 108 Mass. (12 Browne) 433, 434 (1871).

16. 168 Eng. Rep. 455, 461 (Ex. 1796): "[U]nless the first indictment were
such as the prisoner might have been convicted upon by proof of the facts
contained in the second Indictment, an acquittal on the first indictment can
be no bar to the second."
17. See Note, 7 BROOKLYN L. Rgv. 79, 81 (1937).
18. 87 Me. (7 Hamlin) 500, 33 A. 11 (1895); see also Ex parte Gano, 90
Kan. 134, 132 P. 999 (1913).

19. See Note, 7 BROOKLYN L. Riov. 79, 82-83 (1937).
20. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
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A second variation of the same evidence test was developed
in 1911 when the United States Supreme Court, in Gavieres v.
United States,2 1 held that offenses are not the same if each contains an element not included in the other. This "distinct elements test" 22 recognizes that a single act may violate several
statutes, and if each statute requires proof of an additional element which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction under
one statute will not bar a prosecution under the other. 23 Thus,
this test depends upon the minimum proof required by statute
to convict the defendant, 24 not the evidence actually introduced
'25
at trial as required by the "backwards test.
26
A third variation was developed in Burton v. United States,
in which the Supreme Court held that offenses are the same for
double jeopardy purposes only if they are identical in law and
in fact.2 7 This "identity test,' 2 which depends upon the evidence
required to convict the defendant, differs from the other two
variations 29 of the same evidence test in that it would permit
second prosecutions for necessarily included offenses if the defendant were first tried on the greater offense.
It appears that the Louisiana courts have adopted the "backwards test."-" If we accept the premise that the goal of the
double jeopardy clause is to prevent arbitrary reprosecution
and harassment, then this test-which is based on the actual
evidence presented at the second trial-is fairer than either of
the other two variations, depending as they do upon the minimum evidence required by statute or by the evidence alleged
in the indictment. To illustrate, suppose A, who is unarmed,
attacks B, beats him senseless and robs him. B later dies as a
result of the beating. By virtue of his actions, A is now subject
to charges for simple battery, simple robbery, and murder.31 If
the first trial is for simple battery and A is acquitted, the
21. 220 U.S. 338 (1911).

22. Comment, 75 YALE L.J. 262, 273 (1965).
23. Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338, 342 (1911).
24. See Comment, 75 YALE L. J. 262, 273 (1965).

25. See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
26. 202 U.S. 344 (1906).
27. Id. at 380.
28. Comment, 75 YALE L.J. 262, 273 (1965).
29. See notes 19-25 supra and accompanying text.
30. State v. Roberts, 152 La. 283, 286, 93 So. 95, 96 (1922): "[I]dentity of
the offense is an essential element in support of a plea of autre fois . . . the

rule is that . . . the evidence necessary to support the second indictment
would have been sufficient for the first." See State v. Foster, 156 La. 891, 101
So. 255 (1924); State v. McGarrity, 140 La. 436, 73 So. 259 (1916). See also Comment, 21 LA. L. REV. 615, 620 (1961).
31. LA. R.S. 14:30, 65 (1950); id. 14:35 (Supp. 1968).
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prosecutor may want to follow up with an indictment and trial
for murder. Under the "identity test" and the "distinct elements
test," a second prosecution would be permitted because two
additional elements, specific intent and the death of the victim,
are required to prove murder; but, if the only proof used at the
second trial is the same evidence rejected at the first, then the
"backwards test" would bar retrial.3 2 However, since one of the
major purposes of the double jeopardy clause is to preclude
vexatious reprosecutions, 3 it seems senseless to compel a defendant to undergo the second trial in order to determine
whether it should have been barred at the outset-a necessary
evil under the backwards test.
The Same Transaction Test
Various state and federal courts have developed the theory
that double jeopardy attaches when a second trial is attempted
for crimes arising out of the same transaction or motivated by
the same intent. 34 Those courts which follow this approach
examine the defendant's behavior, rather than the evidence presented or the laws governing the offense.3 5 Applying this test
to the hypothetical case above, 86 A must be prosecuted for simple
battery, simple robbery, and murder at one trial or the prosecution will be considered as having waived those charges which
were not made at A's trial, because all three crimes were committed in one transaction, i.e., the attack on B. This is justified
in part by the idea "that to take a contrary view would be to
permit the prosecutor to obtain successive convictions where
several crimes are included within one another, an exception
'37
generally recognized where the same evidence test is applied.
5
In Waller v. Florida,"
the United States Supreme Court appeared to be taking the first tentative steps toward incorporating
the same transaction theory into the double jeopardy clause,3 9
32. See notes 15-29 supra and accompanying text.
33. See notes 9-13 supra and accompanying text.
34. See Kirchheimer, The Act, the Offense and Double Jeopardy, 58 YALE
L.J. 513, 534 (1949).
35. See Horack, The Multiple Consequences of a Single Criminal Act, 21
MINN. L. REV. 805, 812, 814 (1937).
36. See note 31 supra and accompanying text.
37. Lugar, Criminal Law, Double Jeopardy and Res Judicata,39 IoWA L.
REV. 317, 325 (1954).
38. 397 U.S. 387 (1970).
39. See concurring opinion of Justice Brennan in Ashe v. Swenson, 397
U.S. 436, 448 (1970). See also Note, 31 LA. L. REV. 540 (1971). But see Smith
v. Cox, 435 F.2d 453 (4th Cir. 1970); United States ex rel. Brown v. Hendrick,
431 F.2d 436 (3d Cir. 1970); Pulley v. Norvell, 431 F.2d 258 (6th Cir. 1970).
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but as yet this test has not been given constitutional dimensions.
40
In contrast, the Louisiana courts have rejected this theory.
The same transaction test is more restrictive than any of
the other presently accepted approaches, and seems more representative of the layman's idea of fair play under the double
jeopardy guarantee. At first glance, it appears that the guarantee
would become more meaningful if the same transaction test
were given wider acceptance. Admittedly, its application would
bar second prosecutions in many cases where neither the same
evidence test nor any of its variations would have protected
the defendant, but this theory is just as easily circumvented as
is the same evidence test. "Transaction" is an amorphous term
and the manner in which it is defined will determine its utility.
One author has stated the problem as follows:
"The principal shortcoming of this approach is that any
sequence of conduct can be defined as an 'act' or 'transaction'. An act or transaction test itself determines nothing
.... Whether any span of conduct is an act depends entirely
upon the verb in the question we ask. A man is shaving.
How many acts is he doing? Is shaving an act? Yes. Is
changing the blade in one's razor an act? Yes. Is applying
1
the lather to one's face an act? . . . [ad infinitum]."'
Thus many courts refuse to apply the theory as a bar to a second
prosecution by merely ruling that two offenses are not part of
42
one transaction unless the offenses are identical in law and fact
-one of the same methods also used to limit application of the
48
same evidence test.
The CollateralEstoppel Theory
"'Collateral estoppel' . . . means simply that when a [sic]
issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and
final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between
40. See Comment, 21 LA. L. Rlv. 615, 619-20 (1961).

For instances where

the single transaction test has been expressly rejected by Louisiana courts,

see State v. Calvo, 240 La. 75, 121 So.2d 244 (1960); State v. Roberts, 170 La.
727, 129 So. 144 (1930); State v. Montcrieffe, 165 La. 296, 115 So. 493 (1928);
State v. Hill, 152 La. 711, 48 So. 160 (1909); State v. Barrett, 121 La. 1058, 46
So. 1016 (1908); State v. Faulkner, 39 La. Ann. 811, 2 So. 539 (1887); see also
The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1959-1960 Term-Criminal
Procedure,21 LA. L. REv. 366, 370 (1961). But see State v. Batson, 108 La. 479,
481, 32 So. 478, 479 (1902).
41. Comment, 75 YALz L.J. 262, 276 (1965).
42. Harris v. State, 193 Ga. 109, 118, 17 S.E.2d 573, 578 (1941).
43. See notes 27-29 supra and accompanying text.
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the same parties in any future lawsuit." Although the doctrine
was originally developed in civil cases, it has been an established rule of federal criminal law, at least since the decision of
5
the Supreme Court in United States v. Oppenheimer"
in 1916.
Under this ruling, an acquittal in a case is conclusive as to those
46
issues necessarily determined by that judgment.
The term "collateral estoppel" is often used interchangeably
with the term res judicata in various state and federal court
opinions. It is submitted that this practice should be discontinued. Collateral estoppel differs from res judicata in that,
under the latter, a judgment rendered on the merits constitutes
47
an absolute bar to a subsequent action upon the same claim,
whereas the doctrine of collateral estoppel prevents a second
litigation of the same issues between the same parties even in
connection with a different claim or cause of action. 48 Thus,
under the hypothetical case given above, 49 if A were first tried
for simple battery, A might defend by establishing and proving
an alibi that he was elsewhere when B was attacked. If the jury
accepted the alibi and acquitted A, then he could not later be
tried for robbing or murdering B, since the jury had already
ruled that A was not present when B was attacked. In Ashe v.
Swenson,5" the petitioner had been charged with the robbery of
six poker players, each robbery being charged in a separate
count; at the first trial on one count, the prosecution witnesses
could not identify petitioner as one of the robbers and he was
acquitted. Later, petitioner was charged with a second count of
robbery and was convicted. In reversing his conviction, the
United States Supreme Court held that the collateral estoppel
theory was a basic and essential part of the prohibition against
double jeopardy.
Although the Louisiana courts rejected this theory 5' prior
44. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970).
45. 242 U.S. 85 (1916).

46. Sealfon v. United States, 332 U.S. 575 (1948); United States v. Kramer,
289 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1961); United States v. Simon, 225 F.2d 260 (3d Cir. 1955);
United States v. De Angelo, 138 F.2d 466 (3d Cir. 1943).

47. Crowell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352-53 (1876): "It Is a finality as
to the claim or demand in controversy, concluding the parties and those in
privity with them, not only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose."
48. See K. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVo LAW § 18.01 (1959).
49. See note 31 supva and accompanying text.
50. 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
51. E.g., Town of St. Martinville v. Dugas, 158 La. 262, 103 So. 761 (1925).
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to the Ashe ruling, Ashe v. Swenson must now control since,
under the doctrine of Benton v. Maryland,52 federal double
jeopardy standards and concepts apply to federal and state
proceedings alike. As Justice Brennan noted, "it would be incongruous to have different standards determine the validity
of a claim of double jeopardy depending on whether the claim
was asserted in a state or federal court. ' 58 In view of the Ashe
ruling the remainder of this Comment will discuss the ramifications of the collateral estoppel theory and its effect on existing
legal principles.
Elements of the Collateral Estoppel Theory
In civil cases estoppels must be mutual, i.e., a party's claim
will be barred by a former adverse judgment only if he could
54
have used it as a protection had the judgment been in his favor.
This theory of mutuality has not been adopted in criminal
cases: 55 The issue in the previous trial must have been determined in the defendant's favor before that ruling will bar a second trial.5 3 Thus, a conviction will not preclude the defendant
from litigating the same issue at the second trial, even though
a finding in his favor at the first trial would have prevented the
prosecutor from contesting that same issue.5 7 The reasoning is
that when a defendant has been previously convicted, presumably none of his defenses succeeded, and it would be contrary to
his interests to bar relitigation of those issues.
The theory that collateral estoppel in civil cases applies in
a subsequent trial based on a different cause of action 58 has been
adopted in criminal cases, thus barring subsequent trials on the
same issues even though the second prosecution may be for a
See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
53. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 450 (1970). Of. Malloy v. Hogan, 378
U.S. 1, 11 (1964).
54. Mackris v. Murray, 297 F.2d 74 (6th Cir. 1968); Kirby v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 188 F.2d 793 (3d Cir. 1951); Iselin v. C. W. Hunter Co., 173 F.2d 388 (5th
Cir. 1949); DeLuxe Theater Corp. v. Balaban & Katz Corp., 88 F. Supp. 311
(N.D. Ill. 1950).
55. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 464-65 (1970): "[C]ourts that have applied the collateral estoppel concept to criminal actions would certainly not
apply it to both parties as is true in civil cases .
Cf. Coley v. Alvis, 381
F.2d 870 (6th Cir. 1967).
56. Ferina v. United States, 340 F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1965).
57. Of course the prior conviction may still be used by the prosecution
for certain purposes such as the uses allowed under the various rules of evidence. See LA. CODs CRIM. P. art. 495.
58. See notes 45-49 supra and accompanying text.
52. 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
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different offense. 59 The basis of this theory is that to permit the
prosecution to force a defendant, after acquittal, to relitigate
the same issue in a trial for another crime would cause the
same abuses that originally led to development of the prohibition
against double jeopardy.60
In civil cases, collateral estoppel binds not only the parties to
the prior action but also those in privity with the parties."' This
element is not used in criminal cases since the prosecution is
the only party bound by the prior judgment.6 2 Also, the issue
determined in favor of one defendant will not bar further proceedings on that issue against those charged with him for the
63
same offense.
Under both the civil and criminal theories, collateral estoppel does not arise until there has been a valid and final judgment on the merits. 4 Thus a dismissal of an indictment or an
information will not give rise to a defense of collateral estoppel
in another action involving the same offense. 65 However, other
objections might be raised which would serve to bar the second
information or indictment. 6 This rule would also preclude a
judgment by a court which lacked jurisdiction from serving as
a bar to a subsequent trial.6 7
Collateral Estoppel and Permissive Joinder
Collateral estoppel assumes its greatest significance when
it is considered in the context of permissive joinder. The pres59. United States v. Davis, 369 F.2d 775 (4th Cir. 1966); United States v.
American Honda Motor Co., 289 F. Supp. 277 (S.D. Ohio 1968). But see United
States v. American Oil Co., 296 F. Supp. 538 (D. N.J. 1969).
60. See United States v. Kramer, 289 F.2d 909, 916 (2d Cir. 1961). See also
notes 9-13 supra and accompanying text.

61. See notes 45-49 supra and accompanying text.
62. See notes 55-58 supra and accompanying text.
63. United States v. Flowers, 255 F. Supp. 485 (E.D. N.C. 1966).

64. See notes 45-49 supra and accompanying text. There are Indications
that collateral estoppel may apply to evidentiary hearings. See Floyd v.
United States, 365 F.2d 368 (5th Cir. 1966).
65. Robinson v. United States, 284 F.2d 775 (5th Cir. 1960). See LA. COD
CRim. P. art. 595.
66. 7 CRIM. L. REP. 2370 (1970): "Although dismissal of an information
...does not bar refiling of another information based on the same alleged
offense . . . 'Without [sic] the production of additional evidence, or the existence of other good cause to justify a subsequent preliminary examination,
such a practice can become a form of harassment which may violate the
principle of fundamental due process and equal protection of the law, as
announced by the United States Supreme Court.' (Nicodemus v. District
Court, Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, June 24, 1970)."
67. See LA. CONST. art. I, § 9; see also LA. CODE: CrIM. P. art. 595.
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ent trend in the federal courts, in both civil and criminal cases,
is toward requiring joinder of related claims. The Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure encourage the joining of parties in a single
trial and permit joinder of charges which are similar in character or form part of a common scheme or plan.68 There are also
provisions which allow joinder of separate charges in a single
trial where the offenses alleged could have been included in one
indictment or information.6 9 The same thought is reflected in
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which encourage-and
require in certain instances-the consolidation of related claims
in a single lawsuit.70 Although these Federal Rules have not
been given constitutional dimension and many of them are permissive rather than mandatory, 71 they are significant because
they "represent considered modern thought concerning the
72
proper structuring of criminal litigation.
In view of the rulings in Waller v. Florida73 and Ashe v.
Swenson,74 it is submitted that rules of permissive joinder should
be adopted in all states to enable the prosecution to try a defendant for the various crimes he has allegedly committed. This
rule would allow joinder of all offenses which are similar in
character or arise from the same transaction. If the Supreme
Court should ever actually adopt the same transaction test as
part of the double jeopardy clause, then joinder would be compulsory, not merely optional;76 however, this Comment will
examine the proposed permissive joinder rule and its relation
only to the collateral estoppel theory.
Permissive joinder 77 would be beneficial to both parties in
68. FED. R. CriM. P. 8(a).
69. Id. 18.

70. See Id.13, 14, 18, 19, 20, 23, 24.
71. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 455 (1970).
72. Id.
73. 397 U.S. 387 (1970). See also note 38 supra and accompanying text.
74. 397 U.S. 436 (1970). See also note 51 supra and accompanying text.
75. See FED. R. CRiM. P. 8(a).
76. See notes 34-44 supra and accompanying text. See also Note, 31
LA. L. Rzv. 540 (1971) for a complete discussion of the compulsory joinder
rule and the same transaction test.
77. At the outset it is recognized that the criteria for determining when
to allow joinder cannot be precisely defined by a mechanical test. However,
it is submitted that "recurrent factual patterns will emerge, allowing the
court to determine in advance whether reprosecution should be barred ....
In difficult cases, the judge will have to decide, without rules or precedent,
whether the offense could conveniently have been tried at once. But this is
a typical criterion for judicial discretion." Comment, 75 YAL. L.J. 262, 298-99
(1965). The author further states that "[t]here are only a limited number of
ways in which multiple offenses can be committed. Just as in the civil law,
recurring kinds of fact situations will eventually yield helpful criteria for
deciding when joinder should be required .... Id. at 298 n.158.
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a criminal trial. The defendant would be protected from undue
harassment, since second prosecutions would be allowed only
where the interests of justice" required that joinder not be
used in the first trial. The joinder rule would have a more subtle
benefit for the prosecution. Under the collateral estoppel theory,
issues determined favorably to the defendant at the earlier trial
may not be considered by a second jury in a subsequent trial
for a different crime.79 Yet, if the prosecution were allowed to
join related charges, then the same jury, in accordance with an
established rule of the federal jurisprudence,8 0 could acquit on
one count and convict on another. 8 ' The verdict on the various
joined charges need not be consistent 2 because each count in
a multiple count indictment is treated as a separate indictment. 3
No apparent rational explanation is required for a jury's verdict
on several counts 4 so long as there is sufficient evidence to
support the conviction on the count on which the guilty verdict
was returned8s Thus the prosecution could, in effect, litigate
the same issue as many times as there were charges in the indictment so long as the multiple count indictment were submit87
88
ted to the same jury at one trial. This rule of optional joinder
78. See FED. R. Cium. P. 14.
79. See notes 45-47, 49-51 supra and accompanying text.
80. See Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 890 (1931).
81. United States v. Godel, 361 F.2d 21 (4th Cir. 1966); United States v.
Woodell, 285 F.2d 316 (4th Cir. 1960).
82. Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390 (1931); United States v. Bilotti,
380 F.2d 649 (2d Cir. 1967); United States v. Vastine, 363 F.2d. 853 (3d Cir.
1966); Stein v. United States, 363 F.2d 587 (5th Cir. 1966); United States v.
Lester, 363 F.2d 68 (6th Cir. 1966); United States v. Anderson, 362 F.2d 81
(7th Cir. 1966); Maxfleld v. United States, 360 F.2d 97 (10th Cir. 1966);
Canaday v. United States, 354 F.2d 849 (8th Cir. 1966); O'Rourke v. United
States, 347 F.2d 124 (9th Cir. 1965); United States v. Freeman, 286 F.2d 262
(4th Cir. 1961); Gillars v. United States, 182 F.2d 962 (D.C. 1950).
83. Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 393 (1931); Robinson v. United
States, 175 F.2d 4 (9th Cir. 1949).
84. United States v. Vastine, 363 F.2d 853 (3d Cir. 1966); Hill v. United
States, 306 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1962); United States v. Cindrich, 241 F.2d 54
(3d Cir. 1957); Grant v. United States, 255 F.2d 341 (6th Cir. 1958). See
Comment, 60 COLUM. L. Rav. 999 (1960).
85. Aggers v. United States, 366 F.2d 744 (8th Cr. 1966); United States
v. Russo, 335 F.2d 299 (7th Cir. 1964); United States v. Crosby, 294 F.2d 928
(2d Cir. 1961); Call v. United States, 265 F.2d 167 (4th Cir. 1959); Tri-Angle
Club, Inc. v. United States, 265 F.2d 829 (8th Cir. 1959).
86. United States v. Godel, 361 F.2d (4th Cir. 1966); United States v.
Woodell, 285 F.2d 316 (4th CMr. 1960). There are indications that Inconsistent
verdicts will not be upheld In non-jury cases. See United States v. Tankel,
331 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1964); United States v. Maybury, 274 F.2d 899 (2d Cir.
1960); McElheny v. United States, 146 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1944). See also
Bickel, Judge and Jury-Inconsistent Verdiots izn the Federal Courts, 63
H1iv. L. Rav. 649 (1950).
87. This rule will require extensive revision of the Louisiana Code of
Criminal Procedure. See LA. CODE CraM. P. art. 493. See also FED. R. CraM.
P. 13.
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would also lead to a more rational and consistent system of sentencing because the court or jury could consider all the conduct
and charges at one time, as opposed to several courts or juries
considering and evaluating different aspects of the same conduct
at different times.
There are at least four caveats that must be raised should
permissive joinder become the general practice in criminal
cases. First, if some of the offenses were so complicated that
the jury might confuse the issues, then joinder should not be
required. Second, there may be situations in which joinder
would work a hardship on those trying the case: For instance,
where offenses arising from the same transaction are so dissimilar that very little evidence will overlap, both the prosecutor
and defense counsel would have to prepare a double case if the
charges were joined. The third caveat is that a cumulation of
offenses would possibly create prejudice against the defendant,
i.e., the jury would feel that since the defendant was charged
with a number of crimes he must be guilty of at least one of
them. Finally, a jury is likely to use evidence introduced in
support of one charge to convict the defendant of another charge
not independently or adequately proved,8 8 whereas, if the cases
were tried separately, then the evidence on each charge might
be clearly insufficient to convict the defendant. Thus, where
joinder would prejudice the defendant, severance should be
granted and the prosecutor should be allowed to subsequently
prosecute on the other charges.8 9 If, because of any of the above
considerations, separate trials are allowed, it is submitted that
principles of collateral estoppel should be used to preclude retrying issues which were resolved in the defendant's favor at
the first trial.9 0
This proposed rule of permissive joinder, at least when the
offenses overlap, will generally not prejudice the defendant. He
loses no protection against the introduction of evidence about
the related crimes since evidence of related crimes would be
admissible even in separate trials. Also, since the offenses are
closely enough related to require joinder, the same defense will
generally be relevant to all of them.9 1
88. Slovenko, The Accusation in Louisiana Criminal Law, 32 TUL. L. REv.
47, 71 (1957).
89. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 14.

90. See Comment, 75 YALE L.J. 262, 293 (1965).
91. Id. at 295.
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Problems Using CollateralEstoppel in CriminalCases
The collateral estoppel theory presents problems in a criminal case not usually found in a civil case. Since in a criminal
case there are no specific detailed pleadings as in civil cases,92
the issues are not as sharply drawn and a general verdict of
acquittal by the jury usually does not conclusively establish the
basis for the verdict.98 A general verdict of acquittal does not
alone establish whether the jury believed defendant or acquitted
him because the state had not made out its case beyond a
reasonable doubt.94 As a result of this problem, the doctrine of

collateral estoppel has been given only limited approval in many
state courts.9 5 The Supreme Court has taken a different view and
has ruled that when a prior acquittal was based upon a general
verdict, the courts should examine the record of the prior proceeding, including the pleadings, evidence, and other relevant
matter, and determine whether a rational jury could have based
its verdict upon any issue other than that which the defendant
seeks to bar from consideration in the subsequent trial.9 6 The
inquiry "must be set in a practical frame, and viewed with an
eye to all the circumstances of the proceedings."91
This inquiry has been termed the doctrine of "reasonable
speculation"98 and is practiced in some federal courts. Although
it aids in deciding which issues were determined when a general
verdict of acquittal was rendered in the earlier trial, many complicated double jeopardy problems are often left unsolved.9 9 If alternative theories of defense were raised at the first trial or if
there were more than one issue upon which the jury had to pass
to reach its decision, any one of which would have supported
the verdict, then a review of the record by a second court would
probably reflect more guesswork than reasonable speculation. 0 0
If this problem of guesswork could be solved, then it is submitted that the collateral estoppel theory would become the most
92. See LA. CODE CRim. P. art. 598 and comment thereunder.
93. See Lugar, Criminal Law, Double Jeopardy and Res Judicata, 39
IowA L. REV. 317, 334 (1954).
94. Id.
95. See Comment, 28 U. CHi. L. REv. 142 (1960).

96. Mayers & Yarborough, Bis Vexari: New Trials and Successive Prosecutions, 74 HARV. L. REv. 1, 38-39 (1960).
97. Sealfon v. United States, 332 U.S. 575, 579 (1948).
98. Comment, 75 YALE L.J. 262, 285 (1965).
99. Id.
100. Commonwealth v. Cole, reported in 7 CraM. L. REP. 2355, 2356 (1970).
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successful device for preventing unnecessary reprosecutions after
a prior acquittal.
Special verdicts and special interrogatories have become
widely accepted in civil cases 10 ' but they do not seem practical
in criminal cases. 102 Admittedly, they would serve to clarify the
issues which a jury passes upon in reaching a general verdict of
acquittal, and thus make collateral estoppel a forceful doctrine
of criminal law. However, the jury would no longer be able to
render a compromise verdict on multiple count indictments'0 8
without revealing the inconsistency of its determinations-a
factor which might lead to the eventual extinction of the jury's
traditional function of tempering the law with the sympathy of
04
the community.
Conclusion
Although all courts agree that the guarantee against double
jeopardy is an absolute necessity in criminal law, there is considerable confusion in attempting to define the term "same offense" as used in the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution. The three devices which
the courts have developed for this purpose-the same evidence
test, the same transaction test, and the collateral estoppel theory
-have been relatively ineffective in preventing harassment of
the defendant or in eliminating the confusion; for example, at
least one court has even tried to apply all three tests in one
case! 0 5
The same evidence test has been of little help in avoiding
the difficulty because the attempts to define this test have been
almost as confusing and unsatisfactory as the efforts to define the
"same offense." The second theory, the same transaction test,
is more easily defined and would appear to be a better approach
for protecting against double jeopardy since it would allow only
one trial for all crimes committed in the same course of criminal
action. However, this test has, at times, caused the courts to
101. See F. JAMES, CIvIL PROCEDURE § 7.15 (1965).
102. If special verdicts were used, then further revision of the Louisiana
Code of Criminal Procedure would be required since only one special verdict
is allowed in Louisiana. See LA. CODE CRim. P. arts. 641-660.
103. See notes 81-87 &upraand accompanying text.
104. See Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12,
18-19 (1910).
105. Estep v. State, 11 Okla. Crim. 103, 143 P. 64 (1914).
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engage in a game of semantics since "transaction" is a relatively
unmanageable term. Any series of acts may be termed a "transaction" and, until an acceptable system is found for determining
its limits, this approach will be of no more value than the same
evidence test in preventing double jeopardy.
Since the major principle underlying the prohibition against
double jeopardy is the idea that a defendant should be protected
from harassment by multiple criminal trials, the collateral estoppel theory, which is a bar to retrial of those issues determined
in the defendant's favor at the first trial, seems best suited for
fully implementing this principle. However, very few trials
hinge on one issue and when several issues are raised by the
defendant, the courts will sometimes have difficulty in determining which issue or issues were determined by the jury's
general verdict of acquittal in the first trial. The federal courts,
in an effort to alleviate this problem, have developed the theory
of "reasonable speculation" wherein they inquire into the record
of the first trial to determine which issues were decided in the
defendant's favor; this theory has also been recently advocated
by the United States Supreme Court and it could be just as easily
used by state courts. Admittedly, the inquiry into the prior
record will involve a certain degree of speculation, but the advantages of the collateral estoppel device in criminal cases far
outweigh any arguments against its implementation.
In short, any legal device for determining when a second
jeopardy exists will have its shortcomings; but the collateral
estoppel theory provides the best method for preventing double
jeopardy; it is submitted that the advantages of this theory, both
to the prosecution and the defense, far outweigh any arguments
which could be made against its use. Admittedly, certain aspects
of the theory require improvement, but the question then becomes whether there is any legal theory in use today that does
not also need improvement. The long and sustained use of the
collateral estoppel theory by federal courts and some state courts,
coupled with its recent adoption by the Supreme Court in Ashe
v. Swenson,'0 6 argues favorably for its full implementation in
any modern system for the administration of criminal justice.
W. John English, Jr.
106. 397 U.S. 436 (1970).

